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Court Examination of the Discovery File on a 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Both the summary judgment and the discovery provisions of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to foster efficient 
pre-trial resolution of disputes. Discovery was designed to facilitate 
settlements by uncovering all the facts relevant to a dispute before 
trial; 1 summary judgment was designed to dispose of cases present-
ing no factual issue before trial. 2 Yet despite their common goal, 
these two procedures may occasionally be at cross-purposes. Rule 56 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, upon motion 
of either party, a court may grant summary judgment if there are no 
factual issues to be tried.3 But rule 56 fails to prescribe clearly 
whether the trial court in ruling on the motion may rely on the affi-
davits and other supporting material brought to its attention by the 
parties, or whether it must search through routinely filed discovery 
material. If rule 56 imposes a duty to search the discovery file, the 
efficiency of summary judgment may be impaired by the thorough-
ness of discovery. 
This Note examines the history and ambiguous language of rule 
56 to determine whether courts have a duty to examine the discovery 
file before granting a summary judgment. Section I discusses courts' 
differing interpretations of the rule. Section II shows that the 
Supreme Court Advisory Committee which drafted the rule contem-
plated that courts would examine routinely filed discovery materials4 
l. See text at note 50 i,!fra. 
2. See text at notes 44-45 i,!fra. 
3. (a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days 
from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for su=ary judgment 
by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a su=ary judgment 
in his favor upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim 
is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a su=ary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of the hearing 
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A su=ary judgment, inter-
locutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
FED R. CIV. P. 56(a), (b) & (c). 
4. Rules 26 to 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create a discovery process to 
narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties and to ascertain the facts relative to 
those issues. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947). The devices for discovery 
include depositions, interrogatories, requests for admission, requests for production of things, 
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when considering a motion for summary judgment. Section III con-
cludes, however, that the expansion of pre-trial discovery since the 
enactment of the federal rules renders such a trial court duty incon-
sistent with the drafters' intent that the rules "be construed to secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."5 
I. 
Summary judgment is an expeditious means to dispose of cases 
in which there is no genuine factual dispute.6 To avoid the unneces-
sary expense and delay of a trial, either party may move for judg-
ment as a matter· of law by presenting affidavits or other evidence 
showing that there are no material factual issues to be tried.7 Al-
though any doubt regarding the existence of an issue of fact will be 
resolved against the movant, 8 his motion for summary judgment will 
be granted if his opponent can present no evidence to controvert the 
movant's version of the facts. 9 
and physical and mental examinations. The matters that may be inquired into through these 
devices are governed primarily by rule 26, which sets out the permissible scope of discovery. 
The effectiveness of discovery is ensured by the sanctions of rule 37. For a detailed treatment 
of discovery procedures, see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 6 (2d ed. 1977); 4-
4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~~ 26.00-37.08 (2d ed. 1976 and Supp. 1980); 8 C. WRIGHT & 
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL§§ 2001-2300 (1970 & Supp. 1979) 
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. 
If filing requirements have not been waived under rule 5(d), transcriptions of depositions, 
interrogatories and answers to interrogatories, requests for admissions, etc., should all be filed 
with the court. These various discovery documents constitute the discovery record. 
5. FED. R. C1v. P. l. 
6. See FED. R. C1v. P. 56(c); FED. R. C1v. P. 56, Advisory Comm. Note; 10 WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 4, at § 2712. 
7. Although the pleadings may allege different versions of the facts, on a summary judg• 
ment motion the court must weed out unsupported assertions. Thus the court will examine the 
pleadings to ascertain what issues of fact they present and then consider the affidavits, admis-
sions, answers to interrogatories, and similar material to determine whether any of these issues 
are genuine. See 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 4, at§ 2712: 
There has been considerable misunderstanding about the proper role of Rule 56. A mo• 
tion for summary judgment lies only when there is no genuine issue of material fact; 
summary judgment is not a substitute for the trial of disputed fact issues. Accordingly, 
the court cannot try issues of fact on a Rule 56 motion but only is empowered to deter-
mine whether there are issues to be tried. . . . 
On the other hand, the apparent existence of a factual dispute based on a denial in the 
answer or an allegation in tlie complaint does not automatically defeat a Rule 56 motion. 
8. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); United States v. Diebold, 
Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 
9. It is well settled that the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demon-
strating that there is no genuine issue of fact and that he is entitled to judgment as matter of 
law. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). It must be clear what the 
truth is. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962). 
The standard for judging the movant's evidence showing there is no factual issue is the 
subject of some dispute. Most courts have held the moving party to a stringent standard of 
evidence and denied su=ary judgment where there is any doubt as to the nonexistence of a 
factual dispute. See James v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 464 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir. 1972); 
Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. I 183, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Franklin Natl. Bank v. 
L.B. Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Dale Hilton, Inc. v. Triangle 
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In most cases, the party opposing a motion for summary judg-
ment files affidavits and other documents in support of his conten-
tion that there exists a triable issue of fact. Often, however, these 
documents fail to present a triable issue, and occasionally the oppos-
ing party fails to respond at all to a motion for summary judgment. 
In these circumstances, rule 56(c) does not specify whether the court 
must examine the discovery record before granting summary judg-
ment. Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be ren-
dered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 10 
If evidentiary materials "show" by being present in the record, then 
a trial court may not grant summary judgment unless it has searched 
the record to determine if a factual dispute exists. If, however, rou-
tine filing does not constitute a showing, a court may grant summary 
judgment without reviewing the record if the movant adequately 
demonstrates the absence of triable facts and the opposing party fails 
to identify evidence that puts the facts in issue. 11 
The circuits disagree as to whether the trial court must examine 
the discovery file. In Smith v. Hudson, 12 the Sixth Circuit held that 
Publications, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 468, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). When the moving party is the party 
with the trial burden of proof, this standard seems appropriate. The motion is analogous to 
the party's motion for a directed verdict. In both situations the moving party must present 
proof of the existence of the element such that no fact-finder could reasonably find against 
him. See Mihalchak v. American Dredging Co., 266 F.2d 875, 877 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 
U.S. 701 (1959). However, when the party moving for summary judgment does not have the. 
burden of proof at trial, a lesser evidentiary standard may be employed. For a discussion of 
this standard and a proposed "minimal burden" formulation, see Louis, Federal Summary 
Judgment .Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974). Despite the stringent stan-
dard of evidence to which the movant is held, it is possible for a movant to meet his burden of 
demonstrating the absence of a factual dispute even when one in fact exists. See, e.g., notes 12 
& 15 infra. 
This Note does not argue for any change in the moving party's burden of proof. It dis-
cusses only the extent of the evidence that courts are required to consider on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
10. FED. R. C1v. P. 56(c). 
11. An opposing party may, however, avoid summary judgment by submitting to the court 
an affidavit stating reasons why he cannot present "facts essential to justify his opposition." 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). 
12. 600 F.2d 60 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed under rule 60, 444 U.S. 986 (1979). In Smith four 
former school bus drivers alleged that they had been discharged in retaliation for successfully 
suing the school commissioners over a wage dispute. After completion of discovery, 
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported by affidavits of defendant board 
members, minutes of board meetings, a transcript of the relevant board meeting, the affidavit 
of defendant transportation supervisor, the pleadings and orders in the state chancery court 
case which plaintiffs claimed precipitated their discharge, and a transcript of a surreptitiously 
recorded conversation between one of plaintiff's agents and the defendant transportation su-
pervisor which was obtained from plaintiffs on discovery. These materials indicated that there 
was no factual dispute regarding the defendants' motive for discontinuing the plaintiffs' em-
ployment. The plaintiffs failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment, and the dis-
trict court granted the motion. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, plaintiffs identified discovery 
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rule 56(c) unambiguously13 directs the trial court to consider the dis-
covery record to determine whether there are issues to be tried, and 
that it is reversible error for a trial court to grant summary judgment 
if court review of the record would reveal the existence of a factual 
dispute. 14 But rule 56(c) is sufficiently ambiguous to have prompted 
a different interpretation by other courts. The Tenth Circuit has 
read the rule as permissive rather than mandatory, holding in 
.Downes v. Beach 15 that a trial court has discretion to review the rec-
ord "in an effort to weigh the propriety of granting a summary judg-
ment motion, [but] is not required to consider what the parties fail to 
point out." 16 
The question has rarely been addressed as directly as in the 
Smith and .Downes cases, however, perhaps because ·court review of 
the record ordinarily will be at issue only if counsel has been lax.17 
materials on file with the district court that evidenced a factual dispute. The circuit court 
reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the district court could not grant sum-
mary judgment "without first examining all the materials properly before it under 56(c)." 600 
F.2d at 65. Smith also suggests an alternative basis for the decision: that "questions of motive 
or intent are normally not suited to disposition on summary judgment." 600 F.2d at 66. Cf. 
Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 887 (1951) (some 
cases, like negligence actions, peculiarly require jury decision). 
13. 600 F.2d at 64 ("On its face, Rule 56(c) is plain"). 
14. 600 F.2d at 65. The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the Smith interpretation of rule 56(c) in 
EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 617 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1980). 
15. 587 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1978). In Downes, a hospital discharged a group of nurses for 
activities that culminated in a "sick-out" staged to draw attention to labor problems. The 
nurses sought to recover for violation of their first amendment rights. After a jury found for 
the plaintiffs, the district court held that the "sick-out" was not constitutionally protected and 
entered judgment n.o.v. against all the plaintiffs but Downes. The court ordered a new trial for 
Downes because it was unclear whether she had been fired because of her participation in the 
"sick-out" or because of her membership in the group and participation in other protected 
activities. 
The defendant hospital moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits and records 
that showed that Downes had been fired for poor attendance, that the case had been reviewed 
by the Labor Department, and that Downes had received an award in that proceeding. The 
documents showed that the hospital was at fault but that its conduct did not violate a constitu• 
tional right. In answer, Downes reasserted the claims in her pleadings through her own affida-
vit. The court granted defendant's summary judgment. On appeal, Downes claimed that the 
record of the previous trial "demonstrated the existence ofa factual controversy." 587 F.2d at 
471. The Tenth Circuit held, however, that the district court was not compelled to "search 
beyond the evidence proffered in connection with the (summary judgment] motion." 587 F.2d 
at 472. Although the issue in Downes was review of the record of a previous trial rather than 
the discovery record, the Tenth Circuit treated the issues as identical in its discussion of prece• 
dent. Explaining Bushman Constr. Co. v. Conner, 307 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1962), the Downes 
court described filed discovery materials as "beyond the evidence proffered." 587 F.2d at 472. 
16. 587 F.2d at 472 (emphasis in original). 
17. In Smith, the Sixth Circuit observed: 
The record in this case is replete with evidence of instances where plaintiffs' counsel failed 
to adhere to the applicable rules of either practice or procedure. In addition to filing a 
motion which is not provided for by the rules, counsel made no initial response whatever 
to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We believe that it is likely that this 
particular appeal could have been avoided, and that this case could have been properly 
resolved on the merits long ago if plaintiffs' counsel had shown proper concern for matters 
of practice and procedure. 
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Other courts' interpretations of rule 56(c) can only be inferred from 
the manner in which they have handled summary judgment in the 
normal course of litigation. Early decisions reveal that judges ex-
amined the discovery record before passing on a motion for sum-
mary judgment, but do not indicate whether the judges felt bound to 
do so. 18 More recent practice reflects the view that the trial court 
may limit its consideration to evidence that is specifically presented 
to the court. Many district courts have adopted rules that require a 
party opposing summary judgment to submit a short statement of 
the disputed facts and provide that noncompliance may result in an 
adverse judgment. 19 These rules implicitly reject the, Sixth Circuit's 
view that the court is obliged to review the record,20 for they permit 
Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60, 63 n.l (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed under rule 60, 444 U.S. 986 
(1979). See also note 60 infra. 
18. E.g., American Ins. Co. v. Gentile Bros. Co., 109 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1940) ("The 
motion for summary judgment was heard and after . . . due consideration of the contents of 
the depositions, affidavits, and pleadings, the court entered judgment"); Rose v. Connelly, 38 
F. Supp. 54, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ("On these motions for summary judgment and pursuant to 
Federal Rule 56(c), ... I have examined the depositions of the principals on their examination 
before trial"); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. O'Donnell, 29 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1939) ("No 
opposing affidavits have been filed. . . . The mailer is submilled for judgment, therefore, on the 
pleadings, the admissions of record and the depositions on file"); Culhane v. Jackson Hardware 
Co., 25 F. Supp. 324 (D. S.D. 1938) ("A careful consideration of the pleadings and files in the 
above entitled action . . . convinces me that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . 
now in force, the plaintiff's motions for summary judgment should be granted") (emphasis 
added in each quotation). 
19. See, e.g., S.D. ALA. R. 8; D. ALASKA R. 5(B)(4); D. ARIZ. R. l l(h); C.D. CAL. R. 
3(g)(2); E.D. CAL. R. 116(a); S.D. CAL. R. 220-S(b); D. CONN. R. 9(d); D.D.C. R. l-9(h); S.D. 
FLA. R. lOJ; N.D. GA. R. 91.7; S.D. GA. R. 6.6; D. HAWAII R. 2(3); D. IDAHO R. 4(e); S.D. ILL. 
R. 7; S.D. IND. R. 8; E.D. LA. R. 3.10; M.D. LA. R. 5(e); E.D. Mo. R. 7; D. NEV. R. 16(f); 
D.N.J. R. 12(F); D.N.M. R. 9G)(2); S.D.N.Y. R. 9(g); D. OR. R. l l(d); M.D. PA. R. 301.0l(e); 
D.P.R. R. 8N; D.R.!. R. 12.1; M.D. TENN. R. 8(b)(7); N.D. TEX. R. 5.2(a). 
The Second Circuit has approved such a rule. See SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 
585 F.2d 31, 34 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978). Most of the rules do not sanction noncompliance directly 
but, for example, provide that failure of the opposing party to respond to a motion for sum-
mary judgment will be deemed an admission. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. R. 9(g): 
Upon any motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure, there shall be annexed to the notice of motion a separate, short and concise 
statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine 
issue to be tried. 
The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate, short 
and concise statement of material facts as to which it is contended that .there exists a 
genuine issue to be tried. 
All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party 
will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the 
opposing party. 
20. In a recent case, the Sixth Circuit has suggested as much: 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action and for summary judgment. No mem-
orandum contra was filed by plaintiffs, and the district court granted the motion pursuant 
to its rule 3.5.2, which provides in relevant part that 
Any memorandum contra shall be filed within twenty (20) days from the date of service 
of the motion and supporting memorandum, or such other period as the Court may 
require. Failure to file a memorandum contra may be cause for the Court to grant the 
motion as filed. . . . 
During the pendency of this appeal the Court decided in Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 
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courts to grant summary judgment without such a review.21 They 
are consistent with the Tenth Circuit's view that rule 56(c) is permis-
sive rather than mandatory, because they can be interpreted as 
merely prescribing the manner in which the opposing party must 
present evidence opposing a summary judgment motion. 
The incompatible constructions given rule 56(c) belie the Sixth 
Circuit's contention that the rule's meaning is clear.22 Since most 
courts appear to have adopted the Tenth Circuit's interpretation, one 
is tempted to write off the Sixth Circuit's view as anomalous. Yet the 
federal rules are to be interpreted with reference to the accompany-
ing notes and the background of their enactment, 23 and we should 
look to the construction given them by the drafters24 before rejecting 
the Sixth Circuit's view. The next section shows that the drafters 
intended courts to search the discovery record in passing on a mo-
tion for summary judgment. 
II. 
On June 3, 1935, pursuant to the authority granted under the 
Rules Enabling Act,25 the Supreme Court appointed a fourteen 
member Advisory Committee to draft federal rules of civil proce-
dure.26 The committee published two preliminary drafts - one in 
1936, the other in 1937 - and circulated them to the bench and the 
bar for criticisms and suggestions.27 In response to the many com-
60 (6th Cir. 1979) that a district court could not use the failure of plaintiffs to respond to a 
motion for summary judgment as a reason to grant such a motton without having first 
examined all of the discovery materials properly before it and determined that there ex-
isted no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment for the movant was called for as 
a matter of law. Although the instant record contains no suggestion by the district court 
that it had conducted such an examination, and its judgment might otherwise be suspect 
since it is based solely on plaint!lf's non-compliance with local rule 3.5.2, nevertheless this 
Court has considered all of the pleadings and discovery materials in the record and con-
cludes that the action was appropriate for either summary judgment, Smith v. Hudson, 
supra, or for dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction ancf for failure to have stated 
a claim for which relief could be granted. 
Lyons v. Mackey, No. 78-3249 (6th Cir. Jan. 17, 1980) (emphasis added). 
21. If the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of rule 56(c) is correct, these district court rules 
would be invalid under rule 83, which provides that district courts may only promulgate proce-
dural rules that are "not inconsistent with" the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED, R. Ctv. 
P. 83. See generally 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 83.03 (2d ed. 1980). 
22. See note 13 supra. 
23. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 (1970). 
24. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946) (drafters' in-
tention entitled to some weight in construing the Federal Rules). 
25. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ I & 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072 (1976)). 
26. Appointment of Committee To Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 
U.S. 744 (1935). The committee membership included nine practicing attorneys and five 
prominent law professors. See IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 0.511 (2d ed. 1980). 
27. Following the circulation of the 1936 draft, the Advisory Committee received hundreds 
of suggestions for improving the rules. These suggestions were collected and organized by rule 
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ments received on each draft, the committee revised the rules and 
submitted a final version to the Court in November 1937.28 After 
making minor changes, the Court adopted the rules and promul-
gated them on December 20, 1937.29 The rules were reported to 
Congress by the Attorney General on January 3, 1938, and they took 
effect on September 16, 1938.30 At three steps in the evolution of the 
federal rules there are indications that rule 56(c) was intended to 
require a search of the discovery file: the decision to redraft the lan-
guage of the summary judgment provisions in the first preliminary 
draft, the text of the summary judgment provision in the second pre-
liminary draft, and committee member Edson R. Sunderland's com-
ments on what became the current rule 56(c). 
The first preliminary draft of the federal rules provided for sum-
mary judgment in two separate rules: one for a motion upon the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, and another for a mo-
tion upon affidavits.31 The second rule ordered a court to render 
number, and then reduced from their original form to an abstract that reflected the substance 
of the original suggestions in a more concise form. This and certain other materials cited in 
this Note may be found in_Edson R. Sunderland's personal papers, filed by box number at the 
Michigan Historical Collections, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. See E. 
Hammond, Abstracts of Local District Court Committee Reports and of Individual and Asso-
ciation Suggestions (unpublished paper in box #27 of Sunderland's papers). 
28. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT (Nov. 1937). 
29. 302 U.S. 783 (1937). 
30. See generally IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~~ 0.501-0.522 (2d ed. 1980). 
31. U.S. SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Preliminary Draft, May 1936). Rules 42 and 43 pro-
vided: 
Rule 42. Motion for Summary Judgment Upon Pleadings, Depositions and Admissions. 
Any party may make a motion, upon grounds specified therein, for a judgment in his 
favor upon the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file in respect to any or all of the 
matters involved in the action, upon notice to all other parties to be affected thereby. Any 
adverse party may file affidavits in opposition thereto, and the court may in its discretion 
permit either party to take and file depositions or to present oral testimony. If the court 
finds from such pleadings, depositions, affidavits and testimony that there is no substantial 
issue of fact affecting the right of the moving party to judgment, it shall give judgment 
accordingly. 
Rule 43. Motion for Summary Judgment upon Affidavits. 
(a) For Claimant. Any party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim 
may, at any time after serving the pleading presenting the claim, move for a summary 
judgment in his favor thereon. Such judgment shall forthwith be rendered if the motion 1s 
supported by affidavits setting forth facts which, on their face, would require a decision in 
his favor as a matter of law, unless the adverse party shall present opposing affidavits 
setting forth substantial evidence in denial or avoidance thereof. Judgment in this man-
ner may be rendered in an action for declaratory relief. 
(b) For .Defending Party. [A similar provision is made for summary judgment upon affi-
davits for the defending party.] 
It should be noted that under rule 42 the mere filing of the depositions would place that mate-
rial before the court for consideration on a summary judgment motion. 
The May 1936 Preliminary Draft actually had three rules governing summary judgment: 
rule 42 for judgment upon pleadings, depositions, and admissions; rule 43 for judgment upon 
affidavits; and rule 44 for defining the issues when the case is not fully adjudicated on the 
motion for judgment. The first two rules were merged into what became rule 56(c). The third, 
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summary judgment for a party filing an adequate affidavit unless the 
opposing party filed an opposing affidavit "in avoidance or denial 
thereof." This rule permitting summary judgment without review of 
the record alarmed at least one bar association, and the summary 
judgment rules were combined in later drafts, arguably in response 
to that objection.32 
rule 44, now appears substantially as rule 56(d). By combining rule 44 with the other rules, 
summary judgment proceedings could be dealt with under one single rule. Unlike the consoli-
dation of rules 42 and 43, the consolidation of rule 44 appears to have no substantial impact on 
the procedure for su=ary judgments provided for in the preliminary drafts. 
Under rule 56(d), a court that cannot render a summary judgment upon the whole case 
issues, if practical, a pre-trial order specifying the facts that are established without contro-
versy and the facts that are controverted in good faith. The order under 56(d) is very similar to 
the pre-trial order under rule 16; it is a method for salvaging any constructive results from the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment. See 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 56.20(1] 
(2d ed. 1980). The process of examining the materials before the court under rule 56(d) is no 
different from the procedure under rule 56(c); they are in fact the same "hearing on the mo-
tion." Only the determination that the court is required to make under the two rules is differ-
ent. Under rule 56(c), the court decides whether a genuine issue of fact exists; under rule 
56(d), the court, having determined that an issue of fact does exist, specifies what facts appear 
without substantial controversy and are thereby deemed established at the trial. Since the 
court is considering those materials that are already "before it" on the motion for summary 
judgment, this subdivision of the rule provides no insight into what constitutes proper presen-
tation to the court of materials to be considered on a motion for summary judgment rendered 
under rule 56(c). Any materials properly before the court for purposes of a determination 
under rule 56(c) will be properly before the court for a determination under rule 56(d). 
32. Edson R. Sunderland may have believed court review of the record was constitution-
ally compelled. The Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut 
raised the issue in response to the 1936 Draft: 
The only ground upon which summary judgment in a law action may be constitution-
ally obtained - on mere motion, where the pleadings in a cause present an issue of fact, is 
that the issue is in essence, not existent. On any other basis, a party has, in a law action, a 
constitutional right to trial by jury. These rules, instead of confining the procedure to the 
presentation of a record upon which to base a claim for the essential non-existence of any 
issue, in effect, provide for a sort of intermediate trial without jury. Have a redraft of 
Rules 42, 43 and 44 in one new rule. 
E. Ha=ond, supra note 27. Sunderland's copy of the suggestion is marked with a circle 
around the portion advising combination of the three rules into one, and the rules were subse-
quently combined. 
The objection that su=ary judgment may be constitutionally obtained only where there 
is no factual issue in existence and that, therefore, a court must consider the entire record in 
the case is overbroad. Clearly, courts are not expected to undertake their own investigation of 
the case or questioning of witnesses prior to granting summary judgment. Parties must under-
take sufficient discovery or preparation of affidavits in order to bring factual issues to light. 
See text at note 67 i'!fra. 
The right to a jury trial does not dictate a certain procedural form; it merely insures that a 
jury trial be available to a party. In Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920), the Supreme 
Court held that reading to the jury a transcript of a hearing before an auditor who simplified 
the issues and expressed his opinion on various material facts did not infringe any constitu-
tional right. The reasoning of the Court in that case sustains the constitutionality of su=ary 
judgment granted only on the basis of materials presented to the court: 
The co=and of the Seventh Amendment that "the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved" does not require that old forms of practice and procedure be retained. Walker 
v. New Mexico & Southern Pactftc R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596. Compare Twining v. New 
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, IOI. It does not prohibit the introduction of new methods for deter-
mining what facts are actually in issue, nor does it prohibit the introduction of new rules 
of evidence. Changes in these may be made. New devices may be used to adapt the 
ancient institution to present needs and to make ofit an efficient instrument in the admin-
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The 1937 draft, which combined the two earlier summary judg-
ment rules, indicated fairly clearly that the court was expected to 
inspect the materials contained in the discovery record: 
[U]nless the adverse party ... serves opposing affidavits setting forth 
facts sufficient to constitute a denial or avoidance, the judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if (I) the pleadings of the moving party and 
also (2) the depositions and admissions on file together with the affida-
vits, if any, attached to or served with the motion show upon their face 
that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.33 
This language suggests that the only method by which the opposing 
party directly presents information to the court is by serving affida-
vits. If these affidavits do not show the existence of a factual dispute, 
then the court must still decide from the moving party's pleadings 
and affidavits and "the depositions and admissions on file" whether 
a triable issue exists. Since the opposing party is not obligated to 
point out favorable discovery material, the court must search the dis-
covery record. 
After comments were received on the 1937 draft, committee 
member Edson R. Sunderland rearranged the phrases of the sum-
mary judgment rule to produce the version of 56(c) that was submit-
ted to the Supreme Court.34 Sunderland's personal papers confirm 
that the committee expected courts to examine the discovery record 
when considering a motion for summary judgment. In a paper 
designed to educate lawyers about the "new" rules as finally promul-
gated, Sunderland stated: "The adverse party may file such affida-
vits as he may desire in opposition to [a summary judgment] motion. 
Upon the hearing, !fit appears from an examination of the.files, that 
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to 
istration of justice. Indeed such changes are essential to the preservation of the right. The 
limitation imposed by the Amendment is merely that enjoyment of the right of trial by 
jury be not obstructed, and that the ultimate determination of issuesc0Hact by the jury be 
not interfered with. 
253 U.S. at 309-10 (footnote omitted). See generally 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ,i 56.06 
(2d ed. 1980). 
33. U.S. SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRO· 
POSED RULES OF CML PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES at 
38(c) (Preliminary Draft, April 1937) [hereinafter cited as 1937 .Drq/i]. 
34. Sunderland was a professor of law at the University of Michigan from 1904 to 1944, 
and his personal papers are now stored there. See note 27 supra. Sunderland was supervisor 
of the drafts on summary judgment in the federal rules. See 1937 .Drq/i, supra note 33, at vii. 
A copy of the 1937 .Drq/i, located in box #32 of Sunderland's papers, see note 27 supra, and 
identified as his "Marked Copy," shows editing in his handwriting which changes the wording 
of the proposed rule 38(c) into the final version adopted as rule 56(c). Sunderland's papers 
also contain various other drafts of the rule edited in Sunderland's handwriting. See, e.g., 
Advisory Comm. on Rules for Civil Procedure, Tentative Draft III (March 1936). (Sunder-
land's copy of this unpublished draft is located in box #26 of his personal papers. See note 27 
supra). 
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any material fact, the judgment shall forthwith be rendered."35 Al-
though Sunderland did not directly address the question, his re-
marks suggest that a response to a motion for summary judgment 
was to be optional, and that court review of the filed materials was 
prerequisite to a grant of summary judgment. Further support for 
the Sixth Circuit's view can be gleaned from Sunderland's talks to 
various lawyers' groups, in which he repeatedly described court re-
view of the record in mandatory terms.36 On one occasion Sunder-
land explained: "If there are depositions or admissions on file, these 
also will be considered and the summary judgment will be rendered 
or not, depending upon whether the whole record fails or does not 
fail to disclose an issue of fact."37 
The rule Sunderland sent to the Supreme Court has remained 
essentially intact. The Supreme Court adopted amendments to rule 
56 in 1946 and 1963,38 but none reveals an intent at variance with 
Sunderland's description of the court's obligation to search the dis-
covery record. The 1963 amendment to rule 56 which might at first 
glance seem to alter that obligation also failed to do so. The 1963 
amendment added "answers to interrogatories" (inadvertently omit-
ted by the original drafters) to the list of materials on which sum-
mary judgment could be based.39 It also changed rule 56(e) to 
expressly require that an opposing party "set forth specific facts" in 
opposition to a supported summary judgment motion. If the party 
does not so respond, "summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him."40 Through this amendment, the Supreme 
Court intended to clarify that an opposing party could not rely solely 
35. E. Sunderland, The Principles Underlying the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
22 (Dec. I, 1938) (emphasis added) (located in box #33 of Sunderland's papers, see note 27 
supra). 
36. See Transcript of Speech by E.R. Sunderland, Kansas City Legal Institute (May 25, 
1938) (published by the Lawyer's Association of Kansas City, Missouri) (located in box #3 of 
Sunderland's papers, see note 27 supra) ("If there are any depositions or admissions on file 
under the discovery rules, the court will look at them as well as the affidavits"); Notes to 
Address by E.R. Sunderland, Columbus Bar Association (Jan. 15, 1938) (located in box #5 of 
Sunderland's papers, see note 27 supra) (''The court will then inspect the record, including the 
pleadings, and all affidavits, depositions or admissions on file") (emphasis added in each quo-
tation). 
31. New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Related lo Judicial Procedure in Ohio, 13 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1, 49 (1939). 
38. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 329 
U.S. 839, 862 (1946); Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District 
Courts, 374 U.S. 861, 888 (1963). See FED. R. C1v. P. 56, Advisory Comm. Note (1946 amend-
ment & 1963 amendment). 
39. See FED. R. C1v. P. 56, Advisory Comm. Note (1963 amendment, subdivision (c)). 
40. FED. R. C1v. P. 56(e). This section provides in part: 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required .... The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as pro-
vided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
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on his pleadings to raise issues of fact, and thus to reverse a line of 
cases, primarily in the Third Circuit, that had permitted the plead-
ings to stand in the way of granting an otherwise justified summary 
judgment.41 The Court did not intend to change the standards appli-
cable to the summary judgment motion.42 Therefore rule 56(e) does 
not, by its terms, relieve a court of its obligation to search the record, 
since the original drafters contemplated summary judgment would 
be "appropriate" only if the record failed to reveal a factual dispute. 
The history of the drafting of rule 56(c) indicates that the com-
mittee envisioned a duty to search the discovery record before grant-
ing a summary judgment. Nevertheless, its foresight was obscured 
because both summary judgment and discovery were innovations.43 
Sunderland characterized summary judgment as a "simple" proce-
dure.44 He believed that summary judgment motions would be de-
cided primarily on the affidavits of the parties, and that the 
documents in the discovery file would be regarded merely as supple-
mental material for the court.45 Sunderland and the other drafters 
did not foresee how extensive discovery proceedings would become, 
and hence they did not realize that requiring the court to read 
through voluminous discovery materials would distort the "simple" 
summary judgment procedure they desired. 
III. 
A requirement that courts search the discovery file for triable 
facts before granting summary judgment will presumably preserve 
the right to jury trial of a party whose attorney (perhaps through 
incompetence) fails to bring a material factual issue in the file to the 
attention of the court. It is this party that the drafters of rule 56 may 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so re-
' spond, summary judgment, if appropriate shall be entered against him. 
41. See FED. R. C1v. P. 56, Advisory Comm. Note (1963 amendment, subdivision (e)). 
42. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970). See FED. R. C1v. P. 56, 
Advisory Comm. Note (1963 amendment, subdivision (e)); 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ,I 
56.22(2] (2d ed. 1980). 
43. See FED. R. C1v. P. 56, Advisory Comm. Note (summary judgment recently adopted 
in United States from England); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947) (''The pre-trial 
deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant 
innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."). 
44. See E. Sunderland, supra note 35, at 22 ("But the new rules go still further in develop-
ing the advantages of pre-trial discovery, by providing a definite procedure for rendering a 
summary judgment when it appears from such discovery that there is no substantial issue of 
fact to be tried. The method is very simple."). 
45. See New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Related lo Judicial Procedure in Ohio, 
supra note 37, at 48-49. Sunderland's notes for a speech before the Toledo Bar Association in 
December 1938, located in box#l9 of his papers,see note 27 supra, also explain that summary 
judgment would be rendered upon the affidavits submitted by the parties, and that affidavits 
would be the "normal" way of presenting evidentiary material. He then explained that ff there 
were discovery documents on file, these also would be considered. 
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have had in mind when they assumed courts would search the dis-
covery file.46 Yet the expansion of discovery has resulted in changed 
circumstances which render this assumption of the drafters inconsis-
tent with purposes of the summary judgment rule in the federal pro-
cedural scheme. The drafters intended summary judgment to be 
summary: it was to be a "method for promptly disposing of ac-
tions"47 that would promote the "efficient and economical adminis-
tration of justice."48 This section therefore argues that rule 56(c) 
ought to "be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination" of actions, as rule I directs,49 rather than to require a 
search of the discovery file. 
Edson R. Sunderland expected that discovery would be a valua-
ble aid in promoting justice and fairness through disdosure of evi-
dentiary data that might prove useful in resolving a dispute. 50 
Discovery has not fulfilled Sunderland's expectations. Discovery 
records are often needlessly large, and they frequently contain a 
great deal of information not essential to the determination of a 
given action.51 Many attorneys have come to use discovery to im-
pose delay and expense on their adversaries, thereby bloating the 
discovery record.52 If the trial court bears the onerous burden of 
sifting through the record to ensure that no factual basis exists for 
any claim or defense, summary judgment rulings may be considera-
46. See note 32 supra. 
47. FED. R. C1v. P. 56, Advisory Comm. Note. 
48. "This summary remedy carries to its logical conclusion the theory that the pleadings 
are inadequate to show the existence or the nature of a controversy, and that opportunities for 
pre-trial inquiry into the evidence behind the pleadings are essential to an efficient and eco-
nomical administration of justice." E. Sunderland, supra note 35, at 22-23. Commentators 
have also observed that summary judgment is a necessary aspect of a procedural scheme that 
employs a liberal pleading code. See, e.g., Bauman, A Rationale of Summary Judgment, 33 
IND. L.J. 467 ( 1958); Louis, Federal Summary Judgment J)octrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE 
L.J. 745 (1974). 
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
50. See Sunderland, J)iscovery Btjore Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN, L. 
Rev. 737, 739 (1939); Sunderland, Improving the Administration of Justice, 167 ANNALS 60, 76 
(1933). For comments of other authorities see, e.g., Holtzoff, Instruments of J)iscovery Under 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MICH. L. REV. 205 (1942); Pike & Willis, The New Federal 
J)eposition-l}iscovery Procedure (pts. 1-2), 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1179, 1436 (1938). 
51. In 1980 an amendment to subdivision (d) of rule 5 made filing of discovery materials 
optional upon motion of the court or the parties. See note 58 i'!fra. The committee note on 
the amendment states that the rule was amended both because no use is made of the materials 
after they are filed and because the "large volume of discovery filings presents serious 
problems of storage in some districts." FED. R. C1v. P. 5, Advisory Comm. Note (1980 amend-
ment, subdivision (d)). Although empirical evidence on the use of discovery is scarce, the fact 
that an amendment to the rules was needed to help alleviate the storage problem suggests that 
the volume of discovery has greatly expanded. 
52. See Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil J)iscovery, 31 VAND, L. REV. 1295, 1303 
(1978). For a discussion and statistical analysis of the use of discovery in modern procedure, 
see W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968). 
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bly delayed. Given overburdened trial court dockets53 and the fact 
that denials of summary judgment are rarely subject to appellate re-
view,54 trial courts may even deny summary judgment when an op-
posing party inadequately responds to a well-supported motion if 
court review of an extensive record is the alternative. 55 
The Sixth Circuit's construction of rule 56 also creates inefficien-
cies at the appellate level. When faced with an appellant challenging 
a trial court's inadequate examination of the discovery file before 
granting summary judgment, the appellate court must either search 
the entire discovery record itself56 or require the appellant to bring 
to the court's attention the matters in the discovery record that create 
a triable issue. Should the court select the first alternative, it will 
double the burden the Sixth Circuit's rule imposes on the judiciary. 
Should it elect the second alternative, the court will require the same 
presentation that might have been made at the trial level to defeat 
the motion originally.57 
Even though recent amendments to the federal rules may make 
discovery files less bulky than in the past, 58 it seems appropriate to 
place the burden of identifying material issues of fact on the party 
opposing summary judgment rather than on the trial court.59 First, 
53. During 1979 (the latest period for which figures are available) a total of 162,469 civil 
cases were filed in the district courts, an increase of 12.5 percent over the 144,400 cases filed 
during 1978. Despite a significant increase in terminations, the pending civil caseload also 
continued to rise, increasing 6.4 percent from 173,100 in 1978 to 184,104 in 1979. This pending 
caseload is the largest ever in the district courts. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS 5 (1980). 
54. Denial of summary judgment is an interlocutory order from which appeal is unavaila-
ble until the entry of judgment following the trial on the merits. See United States v. Florian, 
312 U.S. 656 (1941) (per curiam). 
55. Cf. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971) (summary judgment 
inappropriate if the procedure requires as much time as a full-dress trial). 
56. This appears to be what the Sixth Circuit did in Lyons v. Mackey, No. 78-3249 (6th 
Cir. Jan. 17, 1980). See note 20 supra. 
57. This was in fact what occurred in Smith v. Hudson. In its appeal from the district 
court's grant of summary judgment, appellant specified the material that disclosed a material 
issue of fact to the appellate court. Brief for Appellant at 7, Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60 (6th 
Cir.), cert. dismissed under rule 60, 444 U.S. 986 (1979). The Sixth Circuit recognized this 
difficulty, commenting in a footnote: "[Plaintiff's] counsel made no initial response whatever 
to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. We J:>elieve it is likely that this case could 
have been properly resolved long ago on the merits if plaintiff's counsel had shown proper 
concern for matters of practice and procedure." 600 F.2d at 63 n.l. 
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d). Before the 1980 amendment rule 5(d) provided that "[a]ll papers 
after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either 
before service or within a reasonable time thereafter." The amendment allows the court "on 
motion of a party or on its own initiative [to] order that depositions upon oral examination and 
interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission, and answers and responses 
thereto not be filed unless on order of the court or for use in the proceeding." 
59. Moreover, the choice between the Sixth Circuit and Tenth Circuit rules is not one of 
placing the burden on the court or on the opposing party. Even if the trial court were required 
to search the discovery record, the opponent's attorney would be foolish not to point out dis-
covery materials that show an issue of fact. Thus under the Sixth Circuit's rule the trial court, 
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the party opposing summary judgment is much better equipped than 
the trial court to winnow from the discovery file the issue of fact that 
would defeat an adequately supported motion. The opposing party 
is better equipped to search the discovery file because of his involve-
ment in compiling it. Counsel for the opposing party is present when 
the depositions are taken, has an opportunity to review the text of 
the depositions, and frames or answers the interrogatories and re-
quests for admissions that go into the discovery file. 60 Even when 
the file is relatively small, summary judgment would be more effi-
cient if the opposing party - who is familiar with the file -
searched the record rather than a trial court which comes to it cold. 
Second, requiring an opposing party to identify evidence to rebut 
a well-supported summary judgment motion is consistent with the 
balance between fairness and efficiency struck elsewhere in the fed-
eral procedural scheme. Federal procedural rules require parties to 
prepare diligently for trial,61 and failure to comply with procedural 
requirements often carries sanctions. Parties must obey provisions 
that dictate both acceptable form and proper timing for motions. 62 
Failure to respond promptly to a request for admissions results in 
admission by default of the matter requested.63 Failure to appear at 
a pre-trial conference may be grounds for dismissal of the action.64 
Similarly, once a plaintiff presents a prima facie case at trial, the 
defendant must either attack the credibility of the plaintiff's evidence 
or introduce new evidence sufficient to raise an issue that requires a 
jury decision, or lose on a directed verdict.65 Even if the defendant 
has strong evidence supporting his position, failure to respond ade-
quately through presentation of this evidence results in an adverse 
judgment. Finally, the summary judgment motion itself imposes a 
the opponent's attorney, and possibly the circuit court, see text at note 56 supra, will each 
search the same haystack for the same needles. 
60. See EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 617 F.2d 443,446 (6th Cir. 1980). While requiring the 
trial court to search the discovery record prior to granting summary judgment, the court ob-
served: 
We find inexcusable the failure of the EEOC to draw to the attention of the District Court 
or this Court· the sworn evidence in the record on which it intended to rely .... The 
record in this case is voluminous and confusing. Overburdened District Judges should be 
able to rely on counsel who are familiar with depositions, documents, and affidavits in the 
file to locate the relevant information. 
617 F.2d at 446. 
61. See, e.g., FED. R. C1v. P. 16; Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); Kaufman, 
Judicial Control over .Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 125 (1960). 
62. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h), 15(a). For example, failure to timely assert lack of jurisdic-
tion results in waiver of the defense. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. Shute, 435 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 
1970). 
63. See FED. R. C1v. P. 36(a). Unless objected to within 30 days, the matter requested is 
deemed admitted. 
64. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (upholding district court dis-
missal of action, with prejudice, for failure of counsel to appear at pre-trial conference). 
65. See, e.g., Dyer v. MacDougal, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952). 
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burden on the opposing party to undertake adequate discovery or 
produce affidavits that reveal a triable issue of fact. Although a 
party may avoid summary judgment by setting forth reasons why he 
cannot produce facts sufficient to raise a material issue,66 mere fail-
ure to undertake discovery without satisfactory explanation will not 
delay granting of an otherwise appropriate summary judgment mo-
tion.67 
In summary, the responsibility of an adverse party to present evi-
dence in opposition to a well-supported summary judgment motion 
is no more burdensome than many other federal procedural require-
ments. Requiring the opposing party to present materials directly to 
the court would not alter the underlying standard of "appropriate-
ness" of summary judgment, 68 but would simply shift the burden of 
searching the discovery file to the party in the best position to show 
the existence of a factual dispute. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the wording of rule 56 nor the proper role of summary 
judgment in the federal procedural scheme requires a court to con-
sider materials not specifically offered in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit's rule permitting but not re-
quiring trial courts to consider unpresented depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions in the discovery file relieves the 
courts of a considerable burden, and assigns the duty to identify ma-
terial facts to the party best able to- discharge it. In the interests of 
judicial economy and the speedy resolution of disputes, the Sixth 
Circuit's interpretation of rule 56(c) -which requires trial courts to 
search routinely filed discovery materials before granting summary 
judgment - should be rejected. Although the drafters of rule 56 
expected that courts would review the discovery record, summary 
judgment could not operate today as the drafters envisioned if the 
court were to bear that burden. 
66. See FED. R. C1v. P. 56(f). 
67. See First Natl. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 298 (1968). 
68. The movant would still have to show that he is entitled to summary judgment by dis-
charging the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact. See note 9 supra. 
